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n her review of the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS),  Baroness  Ashton,  High  Representative  for  EU  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security 
Policy, refers to the role of EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) in the post-Lisbon Treaty 
environment and proposes that they be 
 “fully integrated within the EEAS while retaining a close link to the member states via the 
PSC” (Political and Security Committee).1 
According to the EEAS, the EU’s Special Representatives 
 “promote the EU's policies and interests in troubled regions and countries and play an active 
role in efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law.... acting as a 'voice' and 'face' for 
the EU and its policies”.
2 
Ashton herself points to the importance for the EEAS of having 
 “flexibility to recruit  short-term  senior  figures  (special  representatives,  coordinators  or  EU 
envoys) to undertake specific missions as the need arises.” 
Yet, the comparative brevity of this reference to EUSRs in Baroness Ashton’s report says 
more about her general attitude towards the EUSRs than about the significance of their role 
in EU foreign policy and its image abroad over the past 17 years. 
It  is  no  secret  that  when  Baroness  Ashton  took  up  office  as  High  Representative/Vice 
President in 2009, she viewed EUSRs with some suspicion. The main reason is thought to be 
that because the EUSRs were formally appointed by the Council, she had little control over 
them; the real control was in the hands of the member states through the PSC. 
Although this perception changed somewhat following the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the issue of EUSRs and their place in the EU’s ever expanding foreign policy toolbox 
has continued to be a source of contention, even acrimony, between HR/VP Ashton and the 
                                                       
1 See the Review at: (http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf). 
2 See (http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm)According to this site, 
(unfortunately not updated) the EUSRs cover the following countries or regions: Afghanistan, the African 
Union,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Central  Asia,  Kosovo,  the  South  Caucasus  and  Georgia,  the  Southern 
Mediterranean region, plus an EUSR for Human Rights. Only one EUSR post is held by a woman. 
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member states. Several expressed annoyance at what they considered to be the peremptory 
manner in which she informed them of her intentions.  
Earlier this year, Ashton informed the member states by letter and with little advance notice 
that she intended to terminate three EUSR mandates, including that of the EUSR for Sudan 
and South Sudan and the mandate of the EUSR for the Middle East peace process. Following 
intense pressure from the member states, Ashton had to withdraw the latter proposal. The 
EUSR for the Middle East, who was appointed by the Council upon her recommendation in 
February 2012, had his mandate extended by a Council decision of July this year until 30 
June  2014.  Having  refused  to  renew  the  operating  budget  beyond  31  December  2013, 
however, Ashton effectively pulled the rug from under his feet and terminated his mandate. 
These latest developments have understandably been received with barely disguised anger 
by the member states. Some fear that it is Ashton’s intention to ultimately phase out more, if 
not all, EUSRs. 
While these decisions may be understood within the inner circle of the  ‘Brussels Ashton 
beltway’ as a logical consequence of the Lisbon Treaty, they are not as easily understood in 
the capitals of EU member states and even less so in the host countries and regions where the 
EUSRs were appointed, nor among the EU’s main partners, with whom the EUSRs would 
interact on a daily basis. 
In the case of the Middle East, to withdraw the EUSR before the end of his agreed mandate at 
the very moment the peace process has regained some momentum raises questions about the 
EU’s real commitment to the peace process, even though the EU is the largest contributor of 
financial assistance to that region. Although Ashton has announced that the EU’s seat at the 
Quartet meetings (comprising the US, the Russian Federation, the EU and the UN) will be 
filled by a highly respected and competent figure (her Deputy Secretary General for Political 
Affairs),  the  visibility  and  accessibility  of  the  EU  as  a  foreign  policy  interlocutor  on  the 
ground will suffer, with the Deputy Secretary General having many other tasks to attend to. 
In the case of the EUSR for Sudan and South Sudan, whose mandate was terminated on  
October 31st, Ashton has insisted that the EU’s focus for the wider region will continue with 
an expanded mandate of the current EUSR for the Horn of Africa and with the appointment 
of the Director in the EEAS for the Horn of Africa, East and Southern Africa and the Indian 
Ocean as “Senior EU Coordinator for the Great Lakes Region”. With the experience of having 
himself  been  a  double-hatted  EUSR  to  the  African  Union  and  Head  of  Delegation  in 
Ethiopia, the Coordinator has the advantage of being well known both in the region and by 
the EU’s main partners in the field and is highly respected.  
This will not always be the case, however, should this be the approach that Baroness Ashton 
wishes to promote elsewhere in the future. It would also mean less visibility on the ground 
since  EEAS  senior  staff  having  many  other  responsibilities  to  deal  with,  and  could  be 
interpreted  as  a  lowering  of  EU  interest  and  ambition  in  its  foreign  policy  towards  the 
respective regions. 
All    these  tensions  between  Baroness  Ashton  and  the  member  states  is  unfortunate, 
particularly as it coincides with her increased standing on the international stage following 
significant foreign policy achievements.  
There is no doubt that it could have been avoided on her side with proper preparation, a 
more strategic rather than a personality-driven approach (for which she has been criticised) 
and greater sensitivity shown both to the member states and to the EUSRs themselves, some 
of whom were given just a few hours warning of their impending demise. After all, member 
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carve its image on the international stage, it needs to keep its primary constituents as well as 
its partner institutions, namely the Commission and Parliament, on board. 
It is true that strengthening the management of EUSRs and “enhancing their contribution to 
joint policy-making” became more of a priority as their numbers grew.3 From the first one 
(EUSR for the Great Lakes) appointed in 1996, the network increased to ten in 2005, with the 
appointment of the first ‘double-hatted’ EUSR, merging the functions of Head of Delegation 
and that of EUSR, in November 2005 in Macedonia, a country that had seen a proliferation of 
CFSP instruments. The success of that example spurred other double-hatted appointments. 
To address this expansion in terms of numbers and role, in July 2007 the Council adopted the 
“Guidelines on appointment and financing of EUSRs”. These are now under review, and 
new guidelines are due for adoption by spring 2014, i.e. just before decisions on the renewal 
of mandates of all remaining EUSRs − except one. For some reason, the mandate of the EUSR 
for  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  that  was  adopted  in  2011  runs  until  2015.  Given  the 
deteriorating political situation in that country, there is an obvious need for constant review 
of the EU’s strategy and presence on the ground. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  overall,  EUSRs  constitute  an  important  network  of  senior  policy 
advisers and diplomats, who underpin the functions of the HR/VP and ensure a visible 
presence  of  the  EU  in  countries  or  regions  prone  to  conflict,  over  and  above  the  EU 
delegations  that  are  still  struggling  under  financial  and  administrative  constraints.  They 
provide important added value to the EU’s effectiveness as a viable foreign policy actor and 
contribute to strengthening the image of the EU out in the field, particularly on political and 
security  issues  as  well  as  ensuring  regular  communication  with  partner  envoys.  Their 
regular reports to the PSC can contribute to developing and shaping foreign policy initiatives 
at the EU level with the participation of all member states and institutions. Above all, they 
can ensure coherence of EU actions on the ground. 
To  achieve  this,  the  EUSR’s  primary  responsibility  must  be  to  entertain  permanent 
consultation with the relevant EEAS departments as well as with those of the Commission, 
whose  expertise  is  vital  to  the  EU’s  foreign  policy  together  with  that  of  the  EEAS.  The 
objective  must  be  to  ensure  maximum  synergy  and  coherence  between  the  various  EU 
institutions, missions and operations active in the field. This presupposes of course that the 
profile of the EUSR is carefully considered and is based on objective criteria of competence 
and experience, mediation expertise and in-depth knowledge of EU institutions. 
Will the proposal of Baroness Ashton to have the EUSRs “fully integrated into the EEAS…” 
achieve this? Will it enhance the effectiveness of the EUSRs in terms of their added value to 
the EU’s foreign policy in the field? Since it would require in any case an amendment to the 
Treaty on European Union and the Council Decision on the EEAS,4 would the member states 
agree to such a proposal? 
At first glance this proposal represents a bureaucratic solution to an EU political necessity. 
There is a danger that the EUSRs will become buried  under the multiple layers of EEAS 
hierarchy,  which  is  already  overburdened  and  understaffed   due  to  constant  budget 
constraints. The flexibility under which EUSRs operate would be lost and they would lose 
their ability to act as a focal point within the EU instituti onal system in what unfortunately 
remains a highly competitive environment.  
                                                       
3 G. Grevi, (2007)“Pioneering foreign policy - The EU Special Representatives”, Chaillot Paper No. 106. 
4 See S. Blockmans and C. Hillion (eds), “EEAS 2.0 - Recommendations for the amendment of Council 
decision  2010/427/EU  establishing  the  organisation  and  functioning  of  the  EEAS”,  CEPS  Special 
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There  are  without  doubt  many  improvements,  both  from  a  management  and  budgetary 
point of view, which could be made to ensure the most effective role for EUSRs in the EU’s 
foreign policy. This could easily be achieved without a formal incorporation into the EEAS at 
this stage. The debate scheduled for early next year on new guidelines for EUSRs offers an 
ideal opportunity to agree on these improvements. They could include, for example: 
-  mandates to be reviewed and renewed on a yearly basis to ensure consistency and allow 
for possible adjustments in view of developments in the country or region concerned; 
-  ensuring relevant expertise in the choice of candidates for EUSR, particularly in the field 
of mediation as the EU expands its peace-making role; 
-  ensuring greater gender representation in the appointment of EUSRs; 
-  ensuring  comprehensive  briefing  from  the  EU  institutions  prior  to  posting,  so  that 
appointed EUSRs are fully aware of the EU activities in the field;  
-  maintaining  the  double-hatted  model  in  countries  prone  to  conflict,  but  ensuring 
maximum synergy between the merged EUSR and Commission staff to achieve the best 
results in EU action in the field, as was the case in the Macedonia model. 
Above  all,  what  is  needed  is  a  comprehensive  and  more  strategic  discussion  between 
Baroness Ashton and the member states in assessing the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign 
policy role post-Lisbon, including the role of EUSRs and EU delegations. This would allow 
for possible adjustments to the decision-making process and methods of work within the EU 
institutions, particularly in terms of regaining the former speed of decision-making.  
It would have been extremely useful in this respect if the July EEAS Review presented by 
Ashton  had  focused  less  on  the  other  policy  areas  that  should  be  transferred  from  the 
Commission to the EEAS and more on how the institutions could collectively achieve the 
best results in shaping EU foreign policy, in the true spirit of the Lisbon Treaty.  In this 
respect, the Joint Communication from the European Commission and the EEAS (published 
11th  December 2013)  on  enhancing  its  comprehensive approach  to  external conflicts  and 
crises is a welcome contribution to discussions on this matter.5 
                                                       
5 See press release at: (http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211_04_en.pdf). 